We consider the class of two-person zero-sum allocation games known as Captain Lotto games (Hart 2014). These are Colonel Blotto type games in which the players have capacity constraints. We consider the game with non-strict constraints, and with strict constraints. We show in most cases that when optimal strategies exist, they are necessarily unique. When they don't exist, we characterize the pointwise limit of the cumulative distribution functions of -optimal strategies.
Introduction
A continuous Captain Lotto game is a two-person zero-sum game. Each player is given a nonnegative real number, say, a for player A and b for player B, together with "caps" c A and c B . Player A chooses (a distribution of) a nonnegative random variable X with values bounded from above by c A , i.e., 0 ≤ X ≤ c A , and expectation E(X) = a, and player B chooses with X and Y independent. Thus c A and c B serve as upper bounds -"caps" -on the two players. We assume that c A ≥ a and c B ≥ b (otherwise the set of strategies would be empty). We denote this game by Λ c A ,c B (a, b). When there are no caps, i.e., c A = c B = ∞, this game is known as the continuous General Lotto game. The name Captain Lotto is due to the players' upper bounds, called caps. The case a = b of the General Lotto game is solved by Bell and Cover (1980, Sect. 2) ; see also Myerson (1993) and Lizzeri (1999) . The solution of the nonsymmetric case, a > b, is given by Sahuguet and Persico (2006) ; see also Hart (2008, Appendix) . Sahuguet and Persico use this game to model an electoral competition between political parties. In their model voters perceive the parties as differing in valence (which is interpreted as competence in administrative tasks, ability to make efficient government decisions, etc.). The parties choose how to allocate electoral promises among voters. The party with the greater valence is believed to be able to generate more resources, and therefore is able to make electoral promises under less stringent budget constraints. These games have a predecessor, a discrete game called the Colonel Blotto game. In this game two players simultaneously allocate battalions (say, A for the first player and B for the second player, where A and B are positive integers) across K battlefields. In a given battlefield, the player with the greater amount of battalions wins the battlefield and earns 1/K. The payoff is then the sum of the payoffs across all battlefields. The Colonel Blotto game originated with Borel (1921) , where the game is solved for the case of A = B = 1 and K = 3. Many papers have dealt with this problem. For a recent survey of the literature see Roberson (2006) .
We may view the pure strategies of our players (K-partitions of the amount of battalions that each player has) as distributions of integer-valued random variables with expectations A/K = a and B/K = b, respectively. When adding the assumption that the K battlefields are indistinguishable, since they are chosen with equal probability, the payoff function becomes exactly (1.1). Then, by removing the requirements that the strategies be derived from probability distributions on K-partitions, and that they be integer-valued, thereby allowing any nonnegative random variables with the given expectations, we obtain the continuous General Lotto game. For more details see Hart (2008) . Hart (2014) discusses the value, optimal strategies and -optimal strategies of the continuous Captain Lotto game. The purpose of the present paper is to study the uniqueness of these strategies. In the continuous General Lotto game, i.e., when there are no caps, the optimal strategies are indeed unique; see Sahuguet and Persico (2006) and Hart (2008) . Thus it is natural to ask whether uniqueness holds when there are finite caps. We show here that when the players' caps are equal, the optimal strategies of the two players are unique. When the caps are different, in some cases the optimal strategies for both players remain unique, but in other cases an optimal strategy is not necessarily guaranteed for one of the players. The analysis then focuses on -optimal strategies, and we characterize their limit 1 when → 0. In Section 2 we present known facts and prove some useful lemmas. In Section 3 we treat the case of equal caps, i.e., c A = c B . In Section 4 we treat the case of unequal caps, and in Section 5 we present additional results for the case of unequal caps with strict constraints.
Preliminaries
In this section we rule out some trivial cases and prove useful lemmas.
Consider Λ c A ,c B (a, b). The b = 0 case is trivial since player B has only one possible strategy 2 , namely, 1 0 . As long as a > 0 = b the value of the game is 1 and player A's set of optimal strategies is {X | 0 < X ≤ c A }. The same arguments hold for the b > a = 0 case. The game is even simpler in the a = b = 0 case: the value is 0 and both players can play only 1 0 . Thus we will assume throughout this paper that min{a, b} > 0.
Every nonnegative random variable X satisfies
(see, e.g., Billingsley, 1986 (21.9) ). Since H(X, Y ) = P (X > Y ) − P (Y > X), we easily obtain
2) lemma 1. For every nonnegative random variable X ≥ 0 and every 3 t > 0,
1.
H(U [0,2t] , X) ≥ 1 − E(X) t . (11)). Since the proof is short and we use this lemma repeatedly, we include its proof here.
X ≤ 2t if and only if
Proof.
which proves the first part of our lemma. For the second part we first assume that X ≤ 2t. Thus,
For the other direction, assume H(U [0,2t] , X) = 1 − E(X)/t. Using this assumption and (2.1) gives us
This implies that
thus P (X ≥ x) = 0 for almost every x ∈ [2t, ∞). However, the left-hand side (LHS) is a nonincreasing function and so we obtain that P (X > x) = 0 for every x ∈ [2t, ∞), i.e., X ≤ 2t.
When both players have the same cap, i.e., c A = c B = c, and, without loss of generality we assume a ≥ b, the value of the Λ c,c (a, b) game is 1 − b/a. This is part of Theorem 2 below, which is proved in Hart (2014) . Using this yields the following: lemma 2. Let 0 < a ≤ c. X is an optimal strategy of player A in Λ c,c (a, b) for some 0 < b ≤ a if and only if X is an optimal strategy of player A in Λ c,c (a, t)
Proof. Assume X is an optimal strategy of player A in Λ c,c (a, b) for some 0 < b ≤ a. Let t ∈ [b, a] and let Y be some strategy of player B in Λ c,c (a, t). Define
Thus X is optimal in Λ c,c (a, t). The other direction is trivial. remark 2. Note that in Lemma 2 c may be greater than 2a (and even infinite).
lemma 3. Let X be an optimal strategy of player A in Λ c,c (a, b), and let
where v = valΛ c,c (a, b). 4 The sum of random variables refer to mixture distributions.
Proof. X is optimal; thus
and so
Finally, we cite a version of Helly's selection theorem, and prove a useful outcome.
theorem 1 (Helly's selection theorem). For every sequence F n of distribution functions there exists a subsequence F n k and a nondecreasing, rightcontinuous function F such that lim k→∞ F n k (x) = F (x) at continuity points x of F.
(see, e.g., Billingsley, 1986 (Theorem 25.9)). Note that since F is nondecreasing, the set of points where F is not continuous is at most countable. An application of the diagonal method gives a subsequence of F n that converges for every 5 t ∈ R. We also note that it is sufficient to assume that F n is a sequence of nondecreasing functions, that are uniformly bounded, i.e., there exists some 0 < M ∈ R with |F n (x)| < M for every x ∈ U and every n ∈ N. lemma 4. Let {X n } n∈N be a sequence of nonnegative random variables, and assume lim n→∞ E(X n ) = 0. Then for every 6 t > 0, lim n→∞ F Xn (t) = 1.
Proof. Let t 0 > 0. We wish to show that
It is sufficient to show that every converging subsequence of F Xn (t 0 ) convergence to 1. For convenience assume F Xn (t 0 ) converges, and let l ∈ R be its limit.
Observe that for every n ∈ N 0 ≤ F Xn (t) ≤ 1 for every t, and that F Xn (t) is a nondecreasing function. By Helly's selection theorem (Theorem 1), there exists a subsequence F Xn k (t) of F Xn (t), and a function F (t) with
Using (2.1) and the dominated convergence theorem gives us,
5 R denotes the set of real numbers, and N denotes the set of natural numbers. 6 We denote the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a random variable X by F X (t).
= lim
Thus, 1 − F (t) = 0, i.e., F (t) = 1, for almost every t ≥ 0. However, as a pointwise limit of nondecreasing functions F (t) is a nondecreasing function, and so F (t) = 1 for every t > 0.
Equal Caps
In this section we will consider the continuous Captain Lotto game Λ c A ,c B (a, b) when both players have the same cap, i.e., c A = c B = c. We first recall the result of Hart (2014) on the optimal strategies (Theorem 2) and then prove their uniqueness (Theorem 3).
Without loss of generality let a ≥ b; optimal strategies are
for player A, and
for player B.
remark 3.
1. When c ≥ 2a player A's optimal strategy is U [0,2a] . When c < 2a this strategy is no longer feasible since X * must satisfy X * ≤ c < 2a. As a result, instead of playing U [0,2a] , player A replaces the uniform distribution on the interval [2(c − a), 2a], which is a symmetric interval around c, with an atom at c (of the same mass).
2. Player B, the weak player, imitates whatever player A does "as much as he can", namely, with probability b/a, and gives up, i.e., chooses 0, with the remaining probability 1 − b/a. Player A plays the same strategy regardless of player B's expectation b, as long as a ≥ b. When b > a the players switch roles: player B becomes the strong player and player A, who is the weak player this time, imitates player B.
theorem 3. For both players, the optimal strategy of Theorem 2 is the unique optimal strategy.
Proof. When c > 2a the uniqueness proof is identical to the one in the continuous General Lotto game Λ(a, b); see Hart (2008, Appendix) . Assume now that c ≤ 2a; thus
First, notice that the c = a case is trivial. Player A has only one feasible strategy, X * = 1 a . By playing anything less than c player B loses. Thus his goal is to play "as much c" as possibly. Therefore, his unique optimal strategy is Y * = (1 − b/a)1 0 + (b/a)1 a . These are the exact expressions we were hoping for. The c = b case is even simpler since c = b =⇒ c = b ≤ a ≤ c =⇒ a = b = c, causing each player's set of strategies to be exactly {1 c }, and the value of the game to be 0 = 1 − b/a. Henceforth we may assume c > a. Our goal is to show that the above optimal strategies are unique. We divide the proof into two subsections, one for each of the two players, and each subsection is split into two cases: c = 2a and c < 2a.
Uniqueness of the Optimal Strategy of Player A

The c = 2a Case
Assume c = 2a, and so X * = U [0,2a] . Let X 0 be an optimal strategy of player A in Λ c,c (a, b). Let Y = α1 t1 + (1 − α)1 t2 , where α = (t 2 − a)/(t 2 − t 1 ) and 0 ≤ t 1 < a < t 2 ≤ 2a = c. It is immediate that E(Y ) = a; thus Y is allowed as a strategy of player B in Λ c,c (a, a). From Lemma 2 we conclude that H(X 0 , Y ) ≥ 0 (since the lemma guarantees that X 0 is an optimal strategy of player A in the symmetric game Λ c,c (a, a)).
Denote h(t) = H(X 0 , 1 t ). Using Lemma 3, together with the fact that b = a,
There exists some λ ∈ R satisfying
excepting, perhaps, t = a. However, the inequality is also true for t = a since 1 a is a feasible strategy for player B in Λ c,c (a, a).
Notice that
thus h(t) is a nonincreasing function. By integration and the use of (2.1) we obtain
However, we also have
and we conclude that h(t) = λ(a − t) almost everywhere. Hence λ ≥ 0 (since h(t) is nonincreasing). Since both functions are nonincreasing, λ(a − t) ≤ h(t) for every t ∈ [0, 2a], and the LHS is continuous, we obtain h(t) = λ(a − t) everywhere, excepting, perhaps, t = 0. claim 1. X 0 has no atom at t = 2a.
is left continuous in t = 2a, and thus h(2a) = h(2a − ), which yields p = 0.
Using this new information will enable us to find λ.
Notice that for t = 0 we have 1 = λa ≤ h(0) ≤ 1, and so h(t) = 1 − t/a everywhere. Then,
and X * is unique.
The c < 2a Case
Assume c < 2a. Let X 0 be an optimal strategy of player A in Λ c,c (a, b). According to Lemma 2, X 0 is also optimal in Λ c,c (a, a). We express X 0 = αZ+(1−α)1 c , where Z < c, E(Z) = z, and α = (c − a)/(c − z), and for every Y ∈ [0, c] with
Notice that since we have already assumed c > a, we can indeed divide the equation by α, β > 0. Substituting these into the above inequality with their explicit form yields
By combining (3.1) above and the fact that H(Z, W ) is always less than or equal to 1 (see (1.1)), we conclude that z − w ≤ c − a. The W = 1 0 case yields
, where z < w < c − a (W is allowed because 2w < 2(c − a) ≤ c). Notice that according to the c > 2a case of Theorem 2, W is optimal in Λ c,c (z, w); thus
By (3.1) and (3.2) we obtain w ≥ c − a, a contradiction. So z = c − a and α = (c − a)/a. Summary: z = c − a and for every W < c with E(W ) = c − a we have 0 ≤ H(Z, W ) (see (3.1)).
We wish to show that Z is optimal in Λ c,c (c−a, c−a). LetỸ = γW +(1−γ)1 c , where W < c, E(W ) = w, E(Ỹ ) = c − a, and γ = a/(c − w).
Using (3.1) (we can do so since w ≤ c − a < a and W < c), z = c − a and Z < c yields
By 2a > c and c − a ≥ w we obtain
This means that Z is optimal in the symmetric game Λ c,c (c − a, c − a); thus Z = U [0,2(c−a)] (since 2(c − a) < c, we are in the c > 2a case of Theorem 2, and as we saw in this theorem, in such a case the optimal strategy is unique). We conclude that X 0 = X * . Thus
is a unique optimal strategy of player A in Λ c,c (a, b).
Uniqueness of the Optimal Strategy of Player B
The c = 2a Case
We turn now to player B and first assume c = 2a. Let Y 0 be an optimal strategy for player B in Λ c,c (a, b). Let X = α1 t1 + (1 − α)1 t2 be a strategy of player A, where 0 ≤ t 1 < a < t 2 ≤ c. Taking expectation arguments gives us α = (t 2 − a)/(t 2 − t 1 ).
Denote g(t) = H(1 t , Y 0 ). Using Lemma 3 (we switch between players A and B), and valΛ c,c (a, b) = 1 − b/a, gives us
There exists some λ ∈ R with
for every t 1 ∈ [0, a) and t 2 ∈ (a, c]. For every t = a we obtain that g(t) ≤ λ(t − a) + 1 − b/a. However, since 1 a is a feasible strategy for player A we also obtain this inequality for t = a; thus
we conclude that g(t) is a weakly increasing. Moreover, by integration and the use of (2.1) we obtain
is a weakly increasing function). Due to the fact that g(t) and λ(t − a) + 1 − b/a are both weakly increasing, the latter is continuous, and g(t) ≤ λ(t − a) + 1 − b/a for every t, the equality holds for every t, excepting, perhaps, t = 0.
claim 2. Y 0 has no atom at c = 2a.
and by continuity q = 0. (g(t) is left continuous in 2a since
Using (3.4) immediately yields
.
and so the uniqueness of the optimal strategy of player B in the c = 2a case is proved.
The c < 2a Case
Assume now that c < 2a. Let Y 0 be an optimal strategy of player B. We will
If β = 0 then b = c = a, and we have already discussed this situation at the beginning of our proof. Thus we may assume β > 0. Since both X * and Y 0 are optimal, using the first part of Lemma 1 gives us
. By using the second part of Lemma 1, we conclude that Z ≤ 2(c − a). This guarantees z ≤ 2(c − a). Assume z > c − a, and define
which contradicts Y 0 's optimality. Thus z ≤ c − a. We wish to show that Z is optimal for player B in Λ 2(c−a),2(c−a) (c − a, z) (remember that Z ≤ 2(c − a) and z ≤ c − a). Let W be a strategy of player A in Λ 2(c−a),2(c−a) (c − a, z). We define a strategy of player A in the game Λ c,c (a, b) using W :
Thus, Z is an optimal strategy for player B in Λ 2(c−a),2(c−a) (c−a, z). We already know that for every z ≤ c − a we have a unique optimal strategy for player B in Λ 2(c−a),2(c−a) (c − a, z) :
(see the c = 2a case of player B in this theorem).
Thus it remains to show that Y 0 is given by substituting (3.6) into (3.5). We denote γ = 1 − z/(c − a). Let X = αV + (1 − α)1 c be a strategy of player A, where 0 < V ≤ 2(c − a), E(V ) = v, and α = (c − a)/(c − v). Using the fact that V > 0 and the second part of Lemma 1:
With some development of this equation we obtain
From Y 0 's optimality we obtain
As we know, 0 < V ≤ 2(c−a), and E(V ) = v. Thus we may choose v < c−a, which yields 1 − a/(c − v) > 0, or v > c − a, which yields 1 − a/(c − v) < 0. Applying these two possibilities to (3.7) yields βγ = 1 − b/a. By substituting
Thus Y 0 =Ỹ (z 0 ) = Y * , and we are done.
Unequal Caps
In this section we consider the game Λ c A ,c B (a, b) in the case of unequal caps. Thus c A = c B and, without loss of generality, c A > c B (note that we no longer assume a ≥ b).
Clearly, all the cases where c A > c B ≡ c are equivalent, as any value above the upper bound c of player B has the same effect, and so player A would want to use the lowest possible such value. We denote this by c + , which stands for an infinitesimal c + δ > c, and consider the corresponding game Λ c + ,c (a, b). In addition, note that any strategy of player A can be expressed as X = αZ + (1 − α)W , where 0 ≤ Z ≤ c, c < W , E(Z) = z, E(W ) = w > c, and α = (w − a)/(w − z). Since every strategy of player B realizes Y ∈ [0, c], W 's distributions has no effect whatsoever on the payoff function, and so we may assume that, without loss of generality, W = 1 c+δ with δ > 0.
Let > 0. We call a strategy X * of player A -optimal if it satisfies
We first recall the result of Hart (2014) on the value, optimal strategies and -optimal strategies of the Λ c A ,c B (a, b) game. 
Optimal strategies X * and Y * of player A and player B, respectively, are as follows.
(ii) When b ≤ a ≤ c/2 and a > 0 :
(iii) When a ≤ b ≤ c/2 and b > 0 :
(v) When c/2 < b ≤ c and a ≤ c :
(vi) When a > c : Any feasible X with values > c (for example, X * = 1 a ) is optimal, and any Y is optimal. remark 4. We rule out some trivial cases:
• When a = b = 0 : The only possible strategy for both players is 1 0 .
• When a > c : In this case by playing 1 a player A guarantees H(1 a , Y ) = 1 for every Y of player B. Thus valΛ c + ,c (a, b) = 1, every strategy X of player A with X > c is optimal, and every strategy of player B is optimal.
For the rest of this section, we will assume a ≤ c, and, as pointed out in Section 2, min{a, b} > 0.
In Section 4.1 we show that the optimal strategies of Theorem 4 in the case of 0 < max{a, b} ≤ c/2 are unique. In Sections 4.2 and 4.3, while for player B we still discuss whether his(her) optimal strategies are unique, for player A the discussion changes somewhat. We cannot talk about uniqueness of -optimal strategies. However, as we will see, given a sequence X n , where X n is an noptimal strategy, with lim n→∞ n = 0, we characterize all of its CDFs' pointwise limits. Note that even as we look at Λ c + ,c (a, b), all the results of this section hold when c A = ∞.
Cases
(ii) and (iii): 0 < max{a, b} ≤ c/2. theorem 5. The optimal strategies of Theorem 4 in cases (ii) and (iii) are the unique optimal strategies for both players.
Proof. When c > max{2a, 2b}, uniqueness follows from the same proof as in Hart (2008, Appendix) . When c = max{2a, 2b}, the uniqueness of Y * derives from its uniqueness in Λ c,c (a, b) (see Theorem 3), and so all that remains to show is that X * is unique as an optimal strategy of player A. We divide the proof into two subcases: c = 2a > 2b and c = 2b ≥ 2a.
First assume c = 2a > 2b. Let X 0 be an optimal strategy of player A. We express X 0 = αZ+(1−α)1 c+δ , where 0 ≤ Z ≤ c with E(Z) = z and α = (c + δ − a)/(c + δ − z). We wish to show that α = 1. Assume α < 1, and notice that α < 1 ⇔ z < a.
is an optimal strategy of player B in Λ c + ,c (z, b) (this is the c > max{2a, 2b} case of this theorem). Thus,
It is easy to verify that α ≥ (c − a)/(c − z), and so
Rearranging yields,
By multiplying by ab(c−z), and substituting c = 2a, we obtain:
Since z < b < a, we have 2ab ≤ z(a + b) < 2ab, a contradiction. Thus z ≥ b. Let Y = βZ + (1 − β)1 0 with β = b/z (we use the same Z from the strategy X 0 ). Y is allowed for player B since 0 ≤ Z ≤ c and z ≥ b. By the optimality of X 0 , we get
(The last inequality is obtained by using the fact that H( * , * ) ≤ 1 always). Rearranging yields,
and again using α ≥ (c − a)/(c − z) and substituting β = b/z yields,
Keeping in mind that a = c/2, and that c/2 is the maximum of the function (c − x)x, we obtain that z = c/2. However, z < a = c/2, a contradiction. Thus α = 1 and our optimal strategy X 0 satisfies 0 ≤ X 0 ≤ c.
gives us X 0 = X * (since c = 2a > 2b). This concludes the proof for the case of c = 2a > 2b. Now, assume c = 2b ≥ 2a. Let X 0 be an optimal strategy of player A, and again we express X 0 = αZ + (1 − α)1 c+δ , where 0 ≤ Z ≤ c with E(Z) = z and α = (c+δ −a)/(c+δ −z). Again we wish to show that α = 1, which is equivalent to z = a. Y = U
which implies z ≥ a and so z = a. Thus, X 0 is optimal in Λ c,c (a, c/2), and from Theorem 3 we are done.
Case
In this case of Theorem 4 we first prove the uniqueness of player B's optimal strategy (Theorem 6). Then, turning to player A, we see that he(she) has no optimal strategies in this case (Theorem 7). However, given a sequence of noptimal strategies X n with lim n→∞ n = 0, we characterize the pointwise limits of its CDFs'. We divide the discussion for player A into three parts:
• 0 < b < c/2 < a < c (Theorem 8).
• 0 < b = c/2 < a < c (Theorem 9).
• 0 < b ≤ c/2 < a = c (Theorem 10). theorem 6. When 0 < b ≤ c/2 < a ≤ c, the optimal strategy of Theorem 4 is the unique optimal strategy for player B.
Proof. Let Y 0 be an optimal strategy of player B in Λ c + ,c (a, b), where 0 < b ≤ c/2 < a ≤ c. Let X be some strategy of player A in Λ c + ,c (c/2, b) (thus E(X) = c/2). We define X a = αX +(1−α)1 c+δ with α = (c+δ−a)/(c+δ−c/2). Thus E(X a ) = a and thus, by the optimality of Y 0 , we obtain
The above is True for every δ > 0, and so we have Proof. Assume that player A has an optimal strategy denoted by X 0 . Notice, 0 < b < a and c/2 < a ≤ c. Thus,
, then X 0 is a feasible strategy for player A in Λ c,c (a, b), and also guarantees a value greater than valΛ c,c (a, b) -a contradiction. We can express X 0 = αZ + (1 − α)1 c+δ , where Z ∈ [0, c], E(Z) = z, α < 1 and δ > 0. Since X 0 is optimal, for every Y of player B we have
Substituting α = (c + δ − a)/(c + δ − z) and some rearranging yields,
Finally, it is easy enough to verify that
and we obtain,
This inequality holds for every Y of player B, and in particular for player B's optimal strategy in Λ c,c (z, b). Thus,
and so z = c/2. Thus Z is a strategy of player A in Λ c,c (c/2, b). Notice (4.1) is true for every Y of player B in Λ c,c (c/2, b), in particular for an optimal strategy. Thus,
which is equivalent to a ≤ c/2 -a contradiction. Assume that z < b. Rearranging (4.2) yields 2bc(c − 2b) ≤ z(c + 2b)(c − 2b).
If b < c/2, we obtain 2bc ≤ z(c + 2b). However, z(c + 2b) < 2cz, thus 2bc < 2cz, and we get b < z -a contradiction. We conclude that as long as b < c/2, player A has no optimal strategies.
When z < b = c/2, again we have equality in (4.2), and this time Z is an optimal strategy for player A in Λ c,c (z, c/2). Substituting b = c/2 and Y with an optimal strategy of player B in (4.1), gives us
which is equivalent to a ≤ z. Thus z < b = c/2 < a ≤ z -a contradiction. Thus, player A has no optimal strategies in Λ c + ,c (a, b) when 0 < b ≤ c/2 < a ≤ c.
We turn now to the characterization of player A's -optimal strategies. theorem 8. Assume 0 < b < c/2 < a < c, and let X n be a sequence of n -optimal strategies of player A with lim n→∞ n = 0. Then
Proof. Let X n be a sequence as described in the Theorem. For every n ∈ N we express X n = α n Z n + (1 − α n )1 c+δn , where Z n ∈ [0, c], E(Z n ) = z n , δ n > 0 and α n = (c + δ n − a)/(c + δ n − z n ). For every Y of player B we have,
Rearranging this equation and using α n ≥ (c − a)/(c − z n ), yields
and since z n ≥ 0 always, we obtain
for every n ∈ N and every Y of player B (when using (4.3), we will omit the constant that multiplies n ) 8 . It is easy enough to verify that
with strong inequality when z < b. Indeed, when z ≥ b, since b > 0 (4.4) is equivalent to (c/2) 2 ≥ z(c − z), which is always true. When z < b, since b < c/2 (4.4) is equivalent to z(2b + c) < 2bc, which is also true.
By substituting Y with an optimal strategy of player B in Λ c,c (z n , b) in (4.3) we get,
Using (4.4) yields,
Proof. It is sufficient to show that every converging subsequence of z n converges to c/2. Let z n k be a converging subsequence of z n (there exists one since z n is blocked). For convenience we look at z n . Denote z 0 = lim n→∞ z n . Taking the limit n → ∞ in (4.5) yields equality in (4.4) for z = z 0 , thus 
Proof. We begin by showing that if
Keeping in mind that H( * , * ) ≤ 1 always, by rearranging the above we get
Thus, X n is also n -optimal in Λ c + ,c (a, c/2) (to be precise, it is (c/2b) n -optimal, but this will not matter).
The equality is given from Lemma 1 since Z n ∈ [0, c]). Rearranging yields,
Since 1/α n ≤ (c − z n )/(c − a) and z n ≥ 0, we have,
Taking the limit n → ∞ and remembering Lemma 5 yields,
thus, the expression for α n and Lemma 5 also yield,
We wish to show that lim n→∞ F Xn (t) = F (t) for every t ∈ R. By Helly's selection theorem (Theorem 1), F Xn (t) has a pointwise converging subsequence F Xn k (t).
• When t < 0,
• When c < t,
This is true because when k → ∞, α n k → 2(c − a)/c according to Lemma 6, and P (c + δ n k ≤ t) → 1 according to Lemma 4.
• When 0 ≤ t ≤ c,
Since α n k → 2(c − a)/c when k → ∞, it is sufficient to show that lim k→∞ P (Z n k ≤ t) = t/c for every t ∈ [0, c]. Notice that since F Xn k (t) converges pointwise, and α n k converges, we know that lim k→∞ P (Z n k ≤ t) exists for every t ∈ [0, c]. Thus we can make do with finding a subsequence of P (Z n k ≤ t) that converges to t/c for every t ∈ [0, c].
As we saw in Lemma 6, X n k is also n k -optimal in Λ c + ,c (a, c/2), and so for every Y ∈ [0, c] with expectation c/2 we have,
Let Y = β1 t1 + (1 − β)1 t2 , where 0 ≤ t 1 < c/2 < t 2 ≤ c and β = (t 2 − c/2)/(t 2 −t 1 ). Denote m k = 1−2(c−z n k )/c− n k , and h k (t) = H(Z n k , 1 t ). Notice lim k→∞ m k = 0 since z n k converges to c/2. Furthermore,
thus h k (t) is a nonincreasing function, and −1 ≤ h k (t) ≤ 1. Without loss of generality assume h k (t) converges pointwise (from Helly's Selection Theorem we know that it has a pointwise converging subsequence, and as we mentioned before, we will make do with finding a subsequence of P (Z n k ≤ t) that converges pointwise to t/c).
Using the same ideas of Lemma 3, we conclude that there exists a real constant λ k with
We obtain,
for all t ∈ [0, c] (for t = c/2 we get the above by letting player B play Y = 1 c/2 ).
Notice that (4.7) guarantees that the sequence λ k is blocked, thus has a converging subsequence. For convenience we look at λ k , and let λ be its limit. For every k ∈ N define
and for every t ∈ [0, c],
By the dominated convergence theorem and (2.1),
Since lim k→∞ h k (t) is a nonincreasing function (as a pointwise limit on nonincreasing functions), G(t) is nonincreasing, and λ ≤ 0.
Since G(t) ≤ lim k→∞ h k (t) for every t ∈ [0, c], G(t) = lim k→∞ h k (t) for almost every t ∈ [0, c], both are nonincreasing, and G(t) is continuous, we conclude that G(t) = lim k→∞ h k (t) for every 0 < t ≤ c.
Since h k (t) converges for every t ∈ [0, c], we conclude that lim k→∞ p k exists and denote in by p. lim k→∞ h k (t) is left continuous at c, and so
(it is easy to verify that indeed the order of the limits can be changed).
We obtain p = 0, and since λ(c/2) = G(c) = lim k→∞ h k (c) = −1, we get λ = −1/(c/2).
Since G(t) = lim k→∞ h k (t) for every 0 < t ≤ c, we obtain
Taking the limit k → ∞ gives us P (Z n k ≤ t) → t/c for every 0 < t ≤ c.
For t = 0 we obtain P (Z n k ≤ 0) → 0 out of monotonicity considerations.
Now that we have proven Lemma 7, i.e., lim k→∞ F Xn k (t) = F (t) = t/c for every pointwise converging subsequence of F Xn (t), we would like to show that for every t ∈ [0, c]
Let t 0 ∈ R. The sequence F Xn (t 0 ) is blocked and thus has a converging subsequence F Xn k (t 0 ). From Helly's Selection Theorem the sequence F Xn k (t) has a pointwise converging subsequence F Xn k l (t). Lemma 7 guarantees that F Xn k l (t) converges to F (t) for every t. Thus F Xn k (t 0 ) converges to F (t 0 ). This is true for every converging subsequence of F Xn (t 0 ), and so lim n→∞ F Xn (t 0 ) = F (t 0 ). theorem 9. Assume 0 < b = c/2 < a < c, and let X n be a sequence of noptimal strategies with of player A lim n→∞ n = 0. Then for every pointwise converging subsequence 
Rearranging this equation and using α n ≥ (c − a)/(c − z n ) and z n ≥ 0, yields
(Notice we omit the constants that multiplies n ). Since b = c/2, we have
By (4.8) and (4.9), we conclude that Z n is an n -optimal strategy in Λ c,c (z n , c/2).
Proof. Let z n k be a subsequence of z n with lim k→∞ z n k = z 0 . Since z n ≥ 0 always, we have z 0 ≥ 0. It remains to show that z 0 ≤ c/2. Assume the opposite, i.e., z 0 > c/2. There exists some large enough K with z n k > c/2 for every k > K. Since Z n k is an n k -optimal strategy in Λ c,c (z n k , c/2), by letting player B play optimally we obtain,
For convenience assume F Xn (t) converges pointwise to F (t). Let z n k be a converging subsequence of z n , and let z 0 ∈ [0, c/2] be its limit. Observe that F Xn k (t) also converges pointwise to F (t). We wish to show that F (t) = F z0 (t), i.e.,
Using (4.8) and letting B play optimally yields,
When taking k → ∞, we have z n k → z 0 and n k → 0, thus
The latter is true since α n k converges, and P (c + δ n k ≤ t) converges to 1 (Lemma 4).
it is sufficient to show that
All we need to do is notice that Z n k is n k -optimal for player A in Λ c,c (z n k , c/2), and repeat the same methods of Lemma 7.
• When t = 0, out of monotonicity considerations we understand that
lemma 10. For every z 0 ∈ [0, c/2] and every
there exists an -optimal strategy X * with lim →0 F X * (0) = y 0 .
Proof. Let z 0 ∈ [0, c/2] and let
There exists 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 with y 0 = β0
Showing that X 2 is an -optimal strategy for player A is not much more complex. It relies on the fact that (c − 2z
is an -optimal strategy for player A in Λ c,c (z 0 , c/2) when z 0 ≤ c/2. (Though our choice of δ will be smaller). Now,
Define X * = βX 2 + (1 − β)X 1 . It holds that X * is an -optimal strategy of player A as a convex combination of -optimal strategies of player A, and that lim →0 F X * (0) = y 0 .
For the case of z 0 = 0 we consider the -optimal strategies
and
theorem 10. Assume 0 < b ≤ c/2 < a = c, and let X n be a sequence of n -optimal strategies of player A with lim n→∞ n = 0. Then
Proof. Express X n = α n Z n + (1 − α n )1 c+δn , where Z n ∈ [0, c], E(Z n ) = z n , δ n > 0 and α n = δ n /(c + δ n − z n ). For every Y of player B we have,
In particular, for
H( * , * ) ≤ 1, thus rearranging and omitting constants that multiply n yield 1 − n ≤ H(X n , 1 c ).
and so,
When n → ∞, we have n → 0, thus lim n→∞ α n = 0, and so,
We now show that lim n→∞ F Xn (t) = F (t) for every t.
(This is an outcome of δ n → 0 when n → ∞, and Lemma 4).
Case (v)
: c/2 < b ≤ c and 0 < a ≤ c.
We begin this case of Theorem 4 by characterizing some of player B's optimal strategies (Theorem 11 and Lemma 11).
theorem 11. In the Λ c + ,c (a, b) game, where c/2 < b and 0 < a ≤ c, Player B's set of optimal strategies contains 10 conv{Ω}, where . Furthermore, notice that 1 c is an optimal strategy of player B in Λ c + ,c (a, c), and so again we obtain H(X, 1 c ) ≤ 2a/c − 1 for every strategy X of player A.
Next, let X be some strategy of player A,
10 conv{Ω} is the convex hull of the set Ω.
thus every Y w ∈ Ω is an optimal strategy of player B, and so every strategy in conv{Ω}.
Unfortunately, in this last case we were unable to completely characterize player B's set of optimal strategies. However, the next lemma provides us with further knowledge of the optimal strategies of player B. It shows that an optimal strategy of player B is uniform in the sense that it is independent of player A's given expectation. Proof. Let X be some strategy of player A in Λ c + ,c (t, b).
When a ≤ t we define the strategy X a = (1 − α)1 0 + αX with α = a/t.
Hence Y 0 is an optimal strategy of player B in Λ c + ,c (t, b). When t ≤ a we define X a = αX +(1−α)1 c+δ with α = (c+δ −a)/(c+δ −t), and δ > 0.
This is true for every δ > 0, thus
Thus, again, Y 0 is an optimal strategy of player B in Λ c + ,c (t, b).
We now turn to player A. We first show that player A has no optimal strategies in this case (Theorem 12). However, given a sequence of n -optimal strategies X n with lim n→∞ n = 0, we characterize the pointwise limits of its CDFs'. We divide the discussion for player A into two parts:
• 0 < a < c and c/2 < b ≤ c (Theorem 13).
• 0 < a = c and c/2 < b ≤ c (Theorem 14). theorem 12. When 0 < a ≤ c and c/2 < b ≤ c, player A has no optimal strategies.
Proof. Assume the opposite, i.e., that player A has an optimal strategy X * . When a > 0 and b > c/2, it is easy to verify that
If X * ∈ [0, c], then according to (4.10) in Λ c,c (a, b) it guarantees a greater value than the value of the game -a contradiction. Thus we can express X * = αZ + (1 − α)1 c+δ , where Z ∈ [0, c], E(Z) = z, α = (c + δ − a)/(c + δ − z) < 1 and δ > 0. By arguments that we have seen before we can obtain,
for every Y of player B, and in particular an optimal strategy of player B in Λ c,c (z, b). Thus,
which is a contradiction to (4.10), unless z = 0. Assume z = 0. Then Z = 1 0 . Using a strategy of player B Y with
which is equivalent to a ≤ 0 -a contradiction. Thus player A has no optimal strategies. theorem 13. Assume 0 < a < c and c/2 < b ≤ c, and let X n be a sequence of n -optimal strategies of player A with lim n→∞ n = 0. Then
By rearranging and using an optimal strategy of player B and other repeated arguments we obtain,
Let z n k be a converging subsequence of z n , and let z 0 be its limit. By (4.12) we have,
which is possible only when z 0 = 0 (since b > c/2). Since z n k is an arbitrary converging subsequence of z n , we conclude that z n converges to 0. Now, taking n → ∞ in (4.12) yields
We claim that lim n→∞ F Xn (t) = F (t) for every t.
• When 0 < t ≤ c,
Lemma 4 gives us that P (Z n ≤ t) converges to 1, and since lim n→∞ α n = 1 − a/c, we get,
This is true thanks to lim n→∞ α n = 1 − a/c, lim n→∞ δ n = 0, and Lemma 4.
• When t = 0, monotonicity arguments yield
remark 5. As in Lemma 10, for every y 0 ∈ [0, 1 − a/c] we can find anoptimal strategy of player A, X * , with lim →0 F X * (0) = y 0 . We do so by taking X * to be a convex combination of two -optimal strategies, X 1 and X 2 , with lim →0 F X1 (0) = 1 − a/c and lim →0 F X2 (0) = 0. The above X 1 and X 2 can be
Unequal Caps: Additional Results
In this section we consider the case of strict constraints Λ c (a, b) with the following modifications:
1. In all cases but the last we require that a < c, and, in case (vi): when a ≥ c any feasible X with values ≥ c is optimal, and any Y is optimal.
2. In cases (iv) and (v): the atom of X * at c + is moved to c, and the atom of Y * at c is moved to 12 c − .
In this section as before we assume min{a, b} > 0, and we also add the assumption that max{a, b} < c (otherwise the game is trivial). We will present our results, however the proofs of all following theorems are somewhat similar to the proofs we have seen so far, or use the same methods, and thus we only give them in Appendix 5.
When c ≥ max{2a, 2b}, we divide our results into three:
1. c > max{2a, 2b} -Theorem 16.
2. c/2 = a > b -Theorem 17.
3. c/2 = b ≥ a -Theorem 18.
Both players have a unique optimal strategy in the Λ c + ,c (a, b) game. When considering strict constraints the optimal strategies of this case, given by Theorem 15, remain unique as long as b < c/2 (Theorems 16, and 17). However, when c/2 = b ≥ a, while player B's optimal strategy remains unique, player A no longer has a unique optimal strategy, but a complete set. We fully characterize it in Theorem 18.
theorem 16. In the Λ c,c − (a, b), where c > max{2a, 2b}, unique optimal strategies are:
theorem 17. In the Λ c,c − (a, b) game, where b < a = c/2, unique optimal strategies are:
for player B. Unfortunately, in this last theorem, as in the corresponding case of Λ c + ,c (a, b), we were unable to fully characterize the limit points of player B's -optimal strategies. 
A.1 Proof of Theorem 16
For both players, optimality follows from Theorem 15, and uniqueness follows from the same proof as in Hart (2008, Appendix) .
A.2 Proof of Theorem 17
For both players optimality follows from Theorem 15. Y * 's uniqueness derives from its uniqueness in Λ 2a,2a (a, b) . We are left with X * 's uniqueness. Let X 0 be an optimal strategy of player A. We express X 0 = αZ + (1 − α)1 c , where 0 ≤ Z < c with E(Z) = z, and α = (c − a)/(c − z). We wish to show that α = 1. Assume α < 1, and notice α < 1 ⇔ z < a. thus Y (w) is -optimal for player B and we are done.
